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CHINA'S NEW FOREIGN LAW FIRM REGULATIONS: A
STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
Jane J. Hellert
Abstract: Following China's accession to the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), the Chinese government issued new regulations governing foreign law firms in
China. A number of commentators have analyzed these regulations to evaluate whether
China is "'on track" to fulfilling the commitments it undertook to gain entry to the WTO.
However, a more basic question that should be addressed is whether the new regulations
meet China's goals in joining the WTO: to foster trade and economic development and
to accelerate the growth of China's legal profession.
Although China appeared willing to engage in significant liberalization of the legal
services sector when it joined the WTO, the new regulations reflect a much more
cautious approach in recognition of the vulnerability of Chinese law firms to foreign
competition. On one hand, the regulations shield an infant domestic industry from
competition in spheres of activity where Chinese law firms already dominate, while, on
the other hand, they favor the expansion into China of some of the largest foreign firms in
the world by erecting costly barriers to entry that deter entry by smaller foreign firms. As
China's market forlegal services expands, and the demand for legal expertise in complex
commercial transactions grows, Chinese firms, which lack a deep pool of attorneys
experienced in commercial transactions, are likely to be squeezed out of the transactional
segment of the market by larger, more efficient foreign firms. China's approach in
adopting the new regulations fails to recognize the benefits of competition and the
regulations should therefore be revised. By lowering barriers to entry and permitting free
interaction between Chinese and foreign lawyers, China can accelerate thedevelopment
of its legal services sector and continue to sustain high levels of economic growth.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The accession of the People's Republic of China ("China") to the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") on December 11, 2001, after nearly
fifteen years of negotiations, was a historic step toward free trade on a truly
global scale. t China's accession package was the most complicated and
lengthy accession agreement by any WTO member ("Member") to date.2
t The author would like to thank Professor Donald Clarke and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journalstaff for their valuable comments.
1 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Ministerial Approves China's Accession
(Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres0le/pr252_e.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2003). See, e.g., Charlene Barshefsky, Enter China: WTO Membership has Important Potential,WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A37, available at LEXis, News Group File; Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, WTO
Approves China's Entry; Move Expected to Speed Beijing's Transition to Capitalism, WASH. POST, Nov.
11, 2001, at A47, available at LEXis, News Group File; Press Release, European Union, China in WTO:
Lamy Hails China's Accession Greatest Leap in History of Organisation (Nov 10, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/china/prl 21101 en.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
2 William Abnett, China and Compliance With World Trade Organization Commitments. The First
Six Months, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH SPECIAL REPORT No. 3: CHINA'S WTO
ACCESSION: THE ROAD TO IMPLEMENTATION 6-7 (Nov. 2002).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL.
12 No. 3
V

The agreement includes over 600 commitments, not including tariff
bindings, covering the full range of China's international trade relations,
3
from trade in goods and services to protection of intellectual property.
In the area of legal services, China's specific commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") 4 seemed to offer the
promise of a new legal landscape in China, one in which foreign firms could
form joint legal ventures with domestic firms and open multiple offices in
every commercial hub in China. 5 However, as China has taken steps to
bring its legal system into compliance with its WTO commitments, 6 it has
also faced tremendous internal pressure to slow the pace of liberalization. 7
In the case of legal services, it appears that protectionist sentiments have
influenced the formulation of China's new regulations on the provision of
legal services in China by foreign law firms.8 Thus, just a year after its
accession to the WTO, China's ability and willingness to fulfill its
commitments with respect to the legal services sector are being questioned. 9
While the question of whether China is meeting its commitments
under the GATS is one that has interested a number of commentators,1° a
more fundamental question is whether the new regulations will meet the
Chinese government's objectives: to foster economic growth and promote

3 Id.
4 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the
World Trade Organization, Annex IB, LEGAl. INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vols. 2830, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available athttp://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26gats.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). The CATS was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round to bring
world trade in services within a legal framework broadly analogous to that governing trade in goods. JOHN
H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 853-854 (4th ed. 2002).
5 China's Entry to WTO Opens up Joint Venture Opportunities,LAWYER (Oct. 15, 2001),
available
at 2001WL 11473564.
6 According to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, China
has "abolished or
revised as many as some 2300 laws and regulations related to foreign trade and economic cooperation to
meet the WTO standards." Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Five
Positive Changes for China's Opening to Outside World (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
http://english.moftec.gov.cni/article/200211/20021100050256 l.xml (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
See Experts: Post WTO Chinese Lawyers Must Improve to Follow Global Criteria,XINHUA GEN.
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
8 See David Murphy, Fencing in the Foreign Lawyers, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 29, 2002,
at 26,
2002 WL-FEER 24511843.
9 See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S
WTO COMPLIANCE 44 (Dec. 11,2002) [hereinafter USTR, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/china-hk-mongolia-taiwan/2002-12-11-China WTO-compliance report.PDF
(last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
is See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 8 (suggesting that the regulations go against the spirit, if not the
substance, of China's WTO commitments); USTR, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 44
(commenting that new regulations raise concerns about compliance).
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they may produce some unintended results. On one hand, they attempt to
protect domestic services providers from competition in spheres of activity
where Chinese firms already dominate. On the other hand, however, the
regulations facilitate the expansion into China of some of the largest-and
arguably most efficient-foreign firms in the world. Instead of protecting
Chinese firms, these trends may combine to squeeze Chinese firms out of
new and growing areas of the market for legal services. Therefore, this
Comment concludes that the regulations are not serving their intended
purpose and should be revised.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of the legal
services sector in China to illustrate why China's domestic legal services
providers have sought protection from foreign competition. Part III reviews
the commitments China made under the GATS with respect to legal
services. Part IV examines the regulations promulgated by the Chinese
government to implement its GATS commitments. Part V analyzes how the
new regulations are likely to affect competition in and the development of
China's legal services sector. Part VI concludes that increased competition
is the key to accelerating the development of China's legal services sector
while sustaining economic growth, and provides some recommendations on
how the regulations may be better calibrated to achieve these goals.
II.

CHINA'S LEGAL PROFESSION HAS MADE GREAT STRIDES IN RECENT
YEARS BUT REMAINS VULNERABLE TO COMPETITION FROM FOREIGN

LAW FIRMS

The history of the legal profession in China explains why the legal
profession in China is underdeveloped today and why the Chinese
government is hesitant to fully liberalize the legal services sector in China.
Lawyers in China have endured a history of persecution and have only
recently begun to grow in numbers. Indeed, Chinese cultural and political
attitudes towards the legal profession did not begin to shift until the late
" See, e.g., Xiao Hongming, The Internationalization of China's Legal Services Market, I
PERSPECTIVES (June 30, 2000) at
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/6_063000/intemationalization-of china.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003);
Amy Sommers, One Year After China's WTO Accession: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full? A
Discussion of the Successes and Challenges of China's WTO Entry, in The World Trade Organization:
Recent Developments (Feb. 7, 2003) (unpublished A.B.A. Sec. Int'l L. & Prac. meeting materials) (on file
with author).
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1970s. Thus, Chinese law firms are generally at a competitive disadvantage
to their foreign counterparts.
China's Historically Persecuted Legal Profession Makes a Dramatic
Recovery

A.,

A review of the political and cultural context of the practice of law in
traditional China provides a basis for understanding why the legal profession
in China is underdeveloped today.
As one scholar has observed,
"[t]raditional China held neither law nor lawyers in high esteem, ' ' ] 2 and
traditional attitudes toward the law that caused the populace to "avoid and
fear involvement with formal legal institutions" were reinforced more
recently during decades of Communist rule. 13 The private practice of law
was banned in China in 1949, then briefly permitted from 1954 to 1957, and
was not revived again until the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976.14
During this time, lawyers "were condemned as the worst of that 'stinking
ninth category' of antisocial elements called intellectuals."' 5
Beginning in 1957, with the advent of the Anti-Rightist Campaign,
and later, during the Cultural Revolution, lawyers were persecuted and their
offices shut down.' 6 Many lawyers were executed or sent to labor camps.17
Law schools were closed from 1967 to 1978' 8 and the few professors who
remained at law departments changed professions or discontinued their
research and teaching.' 9 By the late 1970s, only a few thousand lawyers
20
remained in China.
With Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's assumption of the
chairmanship of the Communist Party in 1978, the legal profession
experienced a political revival. 2' The rehabilitation of the legal profession
" RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 345 (2002)
PEERENBOOM, CIIINA'S LONG MARCH].

[hereinafter

13 See generally Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years,
20 Nw.
J.INT'L L. & BUS. 383, 405-06 (2000); Shen Zongling, The Role of Lawyers in Social Change: China, 25
CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 163, 167 (1993).
14 See, e.g.,
VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
OF
LAW IN CHINA AND
IN THE UNITED STATES 22-24 (1978); PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 346-48.

Is Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China's Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts,
45 AM. J.COMP. L.

793, 793 (1997).
16

17

PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 347.
LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA 33 (Marie-Luise

Nath ed., 1992)

1 Lubman, supra note 13, at 389.
Jianfan Wu, Building New China's Legal System, in CHINA'S LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 38 (John
R.
Oldham ed., 1986).
I9

PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 361.
21 Jerome A. Cohen, The Chinese Legal System: A Primer for Investors, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
20

CoMp. L. 345, 346 (1997).
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22
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24
Lawyers were also needed to create a legal
market-oriented economy.
to join the international economy.25
China
allow
structure that would
Once the government had decided that the legal profession was no
longer taboo, the rebuilding of the legal profession began in earnest.
Recognizing the urgent need for more lawyers, the Chinese government
responded by requesting all provinces and cities to reopen college and
university law departments and set up training programs to train cadres and
develop specialized legal talent.2 6 Simultaneously, in 1980, the National
People's Congress ("NPC") passed the Provisional Regulations on
Lawyers. 27 The Provisional Regulations on Lawyers were intended to
promote the rapid growth of the legal profession with minimal qualifications
28
and an application process that emphasized political criteria and practice.
29
The
Initially, lawyers were not required to pass a bar examination.
Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") did not institute China's first national bar exam
until 1986.30 By 1994, more than 400,000 individuals had taken the exam,
and some 78,000 had passed. 31 In addition, law school enrollment has
increased significantly. In 2001 alone, there were 61,474 graduates and
2
146,782 new enrollees in college and specialized law programs.

22 Id. at 347.
23 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND TE DEFENSE

OF RIGIITS 17 (1998) [hereinafter PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS INCHINA].
24 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 21, at 347.
25

See id at 347-4 .

26

Wu, supra note 19, at 39.
PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 348; William P. Alford, Tasselled

27

Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, 141
CHINA Q. 22, 28 (1995) [hereinafter Alford, Chinese Legal Workers].
28
29

PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 348.
id.

3o Alford, Chinese Legal Workers, supra note 27, at 31.
31 PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA, supra note 23, at 39.
32 NAT'L BUR. OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STAT. Y.B. 677 (2002).

These figures represent a

twenty-eight percent increase in the number of enrollees and a thirty-nine percent increase in the number of
graduates since 2000. Id.
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Chinese Legal Services ProvidersAre Not Yet Competitive With Their
Foreign Counterparts

While the revival of the legal profession in China in the last two
decades has been a tremendous achievement, China's legal services
providers are not yet competitive with their foreign counterparts in a number
of areas. The Chinese government has therefore adopted a highly cautious
approach to liberalization of the legal services sector.
One area of weakness in the Chinese legal services sector is the
shortage of lawyers China continues to face. China has an estimated
120,000 lawyers 33 and over 9500 domestic law firms,34 most of which are
state-run. 35 On a ,er capita basis, however, the number of lawyers in China
is extremely low. 6 Thus, lawyers represent clients in only ten to twentyfive percent of civil and economic cases, and only about four percent of
37
registered Chinese businesses have regular legal advisors.
The emphasis on rapid growth of the legal profession also came with
some compromises in quality.
Under the Provisional Regulations on
Lawyers, an individual could apply to be a lawyer on the basis of minimal
formal education or on-the-job training, love for China, support for the
33 Roundtable Before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 107th
Cong. 34 (2002)
(statement
of Jerome
A. Cohen, Professor, New York University School
of Law),
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/072602/index.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2003); ZrONG Guo FALU
NIAN JIAN [LAW Y.B. OF CHINA] 1272 (2001). Of the 117,260 lawyers in China, only 69,117 hold law
degrees (zhuanzhi lushi) and 15,639 are part-time lawyers (jianzhi lushi). Id. The Chinese system of "parttime lawyers" is discussed in Henry Zheng, The Evolving Role of Lawyers and Legal Practice in China, 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 473, 492-93 (1988). The Chinese government has set a target of 300,000 lawyers by
2010. William P. Alford, A Second Great Wall? China's Post-Cultural Revolution Project of Legal
Construction, II CULT. DYNAMICS 193, 195 (1999) [hereinafter Alford, A Second Great Wall].
" See LAW Y.B. OF CHINA, supra note 33, at 1272.
35 Lubman, supra note 13, at 389.
36 See id. In 2000, China's 117,260 lawyers represented .009% of the population of Mainland China,
or approximately the equivalent of one lawyer per 11,000 people. See LAW Y.B. Ol:
CHINA, supra note 34,
at 1272. In comparison, lawyers represent .32% of the population in the U.S. and .09% in West Germany.
PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 362. According to 1990 census figures, the U.S.
had 779,471 lawyers and judges for a total population less than one quarter the size of China's. U.S.
Census Bureau, Historical Statistic Abstract: Detailed Occupation by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex, in
CENSUS 1990, http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/eeo/eeojobs.pl (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). As of August
2002, Hong Kong had nearly 6000 solicitors and barristers with a total population of 7.3 million. Hong
Kong Trade
Development Council, Profiles of Hong Kong Major Service Industries,
http://www.tdctrade.com/main/si/splega.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003); U.S. Census Bureau, International
Data Base, Countries Ranked by Population: 2002, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbrank.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2003).
37 A.B.A China Law Committee, Written Comments on Rule of Law
Issues Related to the People's
Republic of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, in The World Trade Organization: Recent
Developments (Feb. 7, 2003) (unpublished A.B.A. Sec. Int'l L. & Prac. meeting materials) (on file with
author).
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socialist system, and eligibility to vote and stand for election.38 Even after
the institution of a national bar examination in 1986, quality issues persisted

such that a decade later, barely one-fifth of Chinese lawyers had earned
university law degrees. 39 Another impediment to the improvement of the
quality and professionalism of the legal work force in China has been the
absence of good role models.4 0 Because the revival of the legal services
sector in China is still relatively recent, "[u]nlike other countries, where

young lawyers work side by side with experienced senior lawyers, China's
lawyers to a considerable' extent have had to figure out for themselves what
it means to be a lawyer."'
Another weakness of Chinese legal services providers is their lack of
independence or autonomy. 42

Because the Provisional Regulations on

Lawyers defined lawyers as workers of the state, the legal profession was
not self-regulating. 43 However, some progress has been made in this area.
The non-governmental All China Lawyers' Association ("ACLA") was
formed in 1986 to represent the legal profession and, beginning in 1988, the
government permitted the organization of non-state-owned law firms."
Furthermore, the MOJ has begun to transition from its role as a regulator

into that of a "macro-administrative" entity, regulating the profession at the
macro level rather than on a day-to-day basis. 45 Since the 1996 enactment of
the Lawyers Law, Chinese lawyers have largely been free to choose their

own cases and to run their law practices as quasi-businesses. 4 6 Despite this
progress, the independence of the legal profession is still limited by the
institutional weakness of bar associations, including the ACLA,
47 and the
government's desire to control autonomous social organizations.
38 PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 348.
39 See Alford, Chinese Legal Workers, supra note 27, at 31.
40 PEERENBOOM, CIINA's LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 366.
41 Id. Professor Peerenboom remarks that "in many firms, little time is spent training junior
associates. Further, in making partnership and salary decisions, an associate's ability to generate new
clients is often more important than the quality of service or the associate's legal skills." Id. This emphasis
on rainmaking and the huge disparity between compensation of associates and partners discourages
associates from developing their legal skills and those associates who are qualified are also likely toleave
contributes to continuity and depth problems. Id.
their own firms. This, in turn,
to start
4 The establishment of a competent and independent legal profession is one of the comerstones of
rule of law. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 343-44.
43 Shen, supra note 13, at 167.
4 See Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Beyond, 23 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 751, 789 (1991); Alford, Chinese Legal Workers, supra note 27, at 3 1.
45 Alford, Chinese Legal Workers, supra note 27, at 31.
46 Note, Class Action Litigation in China, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1536 (1998).
47 PFERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 371-72. Even the former secretary
general of the All China Lawyer's Association has conceded that China's bar associations are not up to the
task of regulating the legal profession. Id. at 372.
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Finally, beyond issues of competence and independence, perhaps the
most troubling weakness of Chinese legal services providers lies in the area
of professional responsibility. These problems range from bribery of
officials and judges to more subtle issues of conflict of interest involving the
maintenance of quasi-monopolies benefiting law firms in which regulators
or former regulators have a pecuniary interest or are otherwise associated.48
C.

China Cautiously Opens Its Doors to Foreign Lawyers

Recognizing the relative weakness of Chinese legal services
providers, the Chinese government has exhibited a great deal of reluctance
to liberalize the Chinese legal services market, opening the market only to
the extent necessary to maintain tight control on market access. Thus the
government officially opened its doors to foreign law firms in 1992, 4 9 but
only after a number of foreign law firms had already established
representative offices beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s.50 These firms
circumvented the official ban by using a variety of creative techniques, such
as setting up representative offices in the name of a client or registering as a
consulting firm. 51 A former MOJ official has acknowledged that the
opening of the legal services market in 1992 was necessary "to meet the
demands of economic development and legal exchange" and that the MOJ
was forced to pay52 attention to this issue after an "influx of foreign
'consulting firms.'
In 1992, the MOJ and the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce ("SAIC") began to approve foreign law firms on a trial basis
under the Provisional Regulations on the Setting up of Offices by Foreign
Law Firms within the Territory of China ("Provisional Foreign Law Firm
Regulations").
Under the Provisional Foreign Law Firm Regulations,
48 Alford, Chinese Legal Workers, supra note 27, at 33.
See also PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG
MARCH, supra note 12, at 367-69 (listing accusations against lawyers including bribery, falsification of

evidence, and payment of kick-backs or "fees" for client referrals).
49 PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA, supra note 23, at 36; Yujie Gu, Note,
Entering the Chinese
Legal Market: A Guide for American Lawyers Interested in PracticingLaw in China, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
173, 196 (1999).

So

PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CIIINA,

supra note 23, at 36.

51 See Xiao, supra note 11 (describing how Coudert Brothers established a permanent presence in
Beijing as "in-house counsel" to its clients while providing legal services under its own name). Mr. Xiao
states that under a regulation permitting the establishment of foreign trade consultancies, Coudert Brothers
LLP; Baker & McKenzie; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP; and several British firms
incorporated consulting firms and then set up subsidiaries in Beijing or Shanghai to provide legal services.
Id. By 1989, he reports that ovcr twenty "consulting firms" had been established by foreign law firms. Id.
2 Id.
53 Ministry of Justice & State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Provisional
Regulations
on the Setting Up of Offices by Foreign Law Firms Within the Territory of China, Judiciary Document No.
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foreign law firms could not employ Chinese lawyers, interpret Chinese law
or form joint ventures with Chinese firms. 54 Chinese lawyers employed by
foreign law firms were required to surrender their licenses.55 Furthermore,
foreign law firms were initially restricted to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Hainan and Shenzhen 56 although ten more cities were added to the list in
1994.57 Finally, foreign law firms were only permitted to open a single
office in one city 5 8 and were prohibited from engaging in legal service
activities "in the name of consultants, business companies, etc."
Despite these restrictions, foreign law firms were eager to enter the
Chinese market. 60 In December 1992, out of over one hundred foreign firms
that applied, 61 twelve were approved to begin operations in Beijing,
Guangzhou and Shanghai.62 In the summer of 2000, the Vice Minister of
Justice announced that the "one firm, one office" rule would soon be
63
abolished. By April 2001, 103 foreign firms had been authorized to open
Law Firms],
on Foreign
Regulations
Provisional
1992)
[hereinafter
(May 26,
004
http://www.info.gov.hk/justice/new/depart/doc/setup law-firm e.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
54 See id.
arts. 16-17.
5' Id.art. 17.
56 Ministry of Justice, Notice Regarding the Printingand Distribution of "OperationalRules for the
Examination. Approval and Administration of Foreign Law Firm Representative Offices, "(May 26, 1992),
http://www.isinolaw.com.
17 The ten cities are Ningbo,Tianjin, Dalian, Qingdao, Yantai, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Suzhou, Xiamen,
and Zhuhai. PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA, supra note 23, at 37.
5" However, many firms did not strictly follow the regulations and set up one or more unlicensed law
offices. Ann Davis, Shanghai Exit for Coudert, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 30, 1995, LEXIS, News Group File. In
1995, Coudert Brothers LLP and Baker & McKenzie were later forced to dismantle their Shanghai offices
under pressure from the Chinese government. Id.Both firms had licenses tooperate in Beijing, but not in
Shanghai. Id. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP had unlicensed offices in both Shanghai and Beijing.
Id. At least one firm openly claims to have six offices in China, with a seventh office in Hong Kong. See
Brand, Farrar & Buxbaum LLP, at http://www.attomey.net.cn/southcn/shenzhenbfb.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2003). Brand Farrar is listed under the name of Anderson & Anderson LLP in the Martindale-Hubbell
Law Directory. Anderson & Anderson, LEXIS, Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory Listings. However, this
firm is not on the MOJ's list of foreign law firms licensed topractice in China. Ministry of Justice Notice
No. 11, Oct. 23, 2002, LEXIS, China & Hong Kong Library, ChinaLawlnfo Selected PRC Laws Files,
PRCLEG 2517 [hereinafter Notice No. 11 ] (Foreign Firms approved to practice in Mainland China).
59 Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, art. 3.
'0 See Victoria Slind-Flor, China's Riches Lure Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, LEXIS, News
Group File.
61 id.
62 Foreign Lawyers Licensed in China, XINHUANEWS AGENCY, Oct. 26, 1992, 1992 WL 11228276;
Cao Yong, Door Opens to Foreign Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 2, 1992, 1992 WL 8729374. U.S.-based
Coudert Brothers LLP, UK.-based Denton Hall (now Denton Wilde Sapte), U.K.-based Lovell White
Durrant (now Lovells), and the French firm, Adamas, were the only four non-Hong Kong-based law firms
authorized in 1992. See Ministry of Justice Notice No. 10, Oct. 23, 2002, LEXIS, China & Hong Kong
Library, ChinaLawlnfo Selected PRC Laws Files, PRCLEG 2516 [hereinafter Notice No. 10] (Hong Kong
and Macao firms approved to practice in Mainland China); Notice No. 11, supra note 58. All four firms
authorized to practice in Shanghai were based in Hong Kong. See Notice No. 10, supra.
63 NICHOLAS LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL. ECONOMY 145 (2002). Lardy writes
that the lifting of the one city restriction is important:
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II.

CHINA'S
COMMITMENTS
UNDER THE
GATS HINTED THAT
LIBERALIZATION OF THE LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR WAS IMMINENT

By the time the WTO Ministerial Conference approved the text of the
agreement on China's entry into the WTO at Doha, the terms of its
commitments under the GATS in the area of legal services had been
negotiated in excruciating detail through bilateral accession agreements with
major trading partners such as the United States and the European Union
("EU"). 65 A review of China's Schedule of Specific Commitments
("Schedule") under the GATS provides a basis for understanding China's
new foreign law firm regulations, which incorporate these commitments into
Chinese law.
A.

The Framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: The
Importance of Sector-Specific Commitments

The purpose of the GATS is to expand global trade in services 66 by
bringing trade in services within a legal framework analogous to the General

Since a large share of the work of foreign law firms is advising companies on joint
venture investments, permitting offices in more than once city is important. It means that
foreign law firms will no longer have to choose between operating in Beijing, where all
large-scale projects must be approved, or in Shanghai, China's emerging finance and
banking center. For the first time they will be able to maintain offices in both or any
other combination of cities that facilitates their ability to serve their clients.

Id.
Foreign Law Firms Set Up 103 Offices in China, XINIHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 12, 2001, 2001
WL 19106343.
65 Compare U.S.-China Market Access Agreement, concluded Nov. 15, 1999, as released by the
United States Trade Representative on Mar. 14, 2000, at 6, http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/market/162182.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2003) and Sino-E.U. Agreement on China's Accession to the WTO: Results
of the Bilateral Negotiations, concluded May 19, 2000 [hereinafter Sino-E.U. Agreement],
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/eu-china-wto/wto7.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003) with World Trade
Organization, Protocolon the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Annex IX Schedule of Specific
Commitments on Services List of Article II MFN Exemption, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 5 (Nov. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Schedule of Specific Comnitments],
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tWT/ACC/CHN49A2.doc (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). For an
interesting discussion of the Chinese perspective on the negotiations as described by an MOJ official, see
Xiao, supra note I1.
66 The preamble of the agreement states that the goal is "to establish a multilateral
framework of
principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic growth of all trading
partners and the development of developing countries." GATS, supra note 4, pmbl.

MAY 2003

CHINA 'S NEW FOREIGN LA W FIRM REGULA TIONS

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 67 which governs trade in
goods. 68 Like the GATT, the GATS contains two types of obligations:
those that apply generally to all measures affecting trade in services and
those that are based on sector-specific commitments assumed by individual
Members. 69 Together, they operate to "lock" Members into starting
positions from
which progressive rounds of negotiations can expand
70
liberalization.
General obligations under the GATS, which apply to all measures
affecting trade in services, are derived from cornerstone principles of the
GATT. 71 They include "transparency," which requires each Member to
publish promptly "all relevant measures of general application" affecting
trade in services, and the "most favored nation" ("MFN") principle, which
prevents Members from discriminating among trading partners.7
The GATS obligations of "market access" and "national treatment,"
on the other hand, only apply to those sectors explicitly listed by a Member
in its schedule of commitments.73 The market access provision of the GATS
prohibits six types of limitations: (1) limitations on the number of suppliers;
(2) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets; (3)
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity
of service output; (4) limitations on the total number of natural persons that
may be employed; (5) measures which restrict or require specific types of
legal entity or joint venture; and (6) limitations on the participation of
foreign capital.
National treatment is defined under Article XVII as
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to a similarly situated
domestic services supplier.75 Members may elect to place limitations on
national treatment in their
schedules with respect to any of the four modes of
76
supply described below.
The GATS recognizes that trade in intangible services is different
from trade in tangible goods by defining "trade in services" as the supply of
67

General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.1.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.

i94 [hereinafter GATT], http://www.wto.org/englishidocse/iegaie/iegai_e.him (last visited Apr. 30,
2003).
68 JACKSON ET AL., Supra note 4, at 853.
69

1I.; AADITYA MATTOO, CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: THE SERVICES DIMENSION 3 (World

Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2932, 2002).
70 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 307 (1997).
7 Id. at 307-08.
72 MATTOO, supra note 69, at 3.
73 Id.
74 GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI.
75 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 886; MATrOO, supra note 69, at 3.
76 MATrOO, supra note 69, at 4.
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a service through any of four modes. The "cross-border" mode of supply is
analogous to trade in goods and arises when a service crosses a national
border.77 The "consumption abroad" mode of supply is utilized when the
consumer travels to the territory of the service supplier.78 The "commercial
presence" mode of supply involves foreign direct investment, usually in the
context of the establishment of a branch or subsidiary. 79 Finally, the
"movement of individuals" mode of supply is utilized when independent
service providers80 or employees of a multinational firm temporarily move to
another country.
Because trade in legal services implicates foreign direct investment
and movement of individuals across national borders to a much greater
degree than trade in goods, a Member's specific commitments are more
important than its general obligations under the GATS. Stated differently,
without specific commitments, the GATS, although in principle embracing
the entire services industry, remains an empty shell. 8'
China's Specific Commitments on the Legal Services Sector Focus on
CommercialPresence of Legal Services Providers

B.

The only significant provisions of China's sector-specific
commitments on legal services concern China's limitations on the
commercial presence of legal services providers. 82 China placed no
limitations on either the "cross-border" or "consumption abroad" modes of
supply. 83 With respect to "movement of individuals," China placed no
additional restrictions beyond those contained under the "commercial
presence" mode of supply. China's "market access" and "national
treatment" limitations on the commercial presence mode of supply are
addressed in turn below.
Market Access Limitations Promise the Elimination of Restrictions on
Multiple Offices

1.

Under the "commercial presence" mode of supply, China's Schedule
maintains existing restrictions on the provision of legal services by foreign
" ld at 3.
78 Id.
79 Id.

so Id.
81 Robert F. Taylor & Philippe Metzger, GA TT and Its Effect on the InternationalTrade in Legal
Services, 10 N.Y. INT'LL. REV. 1, 23 (1997).
82 Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 5-7.
"

Id. at 6.
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law firms, while promising to lift geographic and quantitative limitations on
foreign law offices. For example, like the Provisional Regulations on
Foreign Lawyers, the Schedule provides that, "[f]oreign law firms can
provide legal services only in the form of representative offices" in specially
designated cities. 4 The Schedule also states that, "[r]epresentative offices
can engage in profit-making activities.",85 Although the Schedule reiterates
the Provisional Regulations limitation of one representative office, it also
provides that "geographic and quantitative limitations will be eliminated
within one year after China's accession to the WTO. 86
In terms of the types of services foreign representative offices may
provide, the Schedule departs from the approach of the Provisional
Regulations, which listed both permitted and forbidden activities, and
instead provides an exclusive list of permitted activities.87 The Schedule
provides that foreign representative offices are permitted to engage in the
following business activities:
(a) to provide clients with consultancy on the legislation of the
country/region where the lawyers of the law firm are
permitted to engage in a lawyer's professional work, and on
international conventions and practices;
(b) to handle, when entrusted by clients of Chinese law firms,
legal affairs of the country/region where the lawyers of the
law firm are permitted to engage in lawyer's professional
work;
(c) to entrust, on behalf of foreign clients, Chinese law firms to
deal with the Chinese legal affairs;
(d) to enter into contracts to maintain long-term entrustment
relations with Chinese law firms for legal affairs;
(e) to provide information on the impact of the Chinese legal
environment.88
84 Id. at 5. Nineteen cities are the same as before, rnus Haian and ith the add'tion of Hai-kou,
Wuhan, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Kunming. Id.
85 id.
86 id.
87 Compare Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, arts. 15-16
with Schedule
of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 6. Under the Provisional Regulations, there was the very real
possibility for law firms toengage in activities that were neither permitted nor forbidden. See Provisional
Foreign Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, arts. 15-16. Under the Schedule of Specific
Commitments, however, the listing of permitted activities implies that all other activities are forbidden.
See Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at6.
88 Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 6.
This was apparently added after
negotiations with the E.U. See U.S.-China Market Access Agreement, supra note 65.
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The first three activities were already permitted under the Provisional
Regulations, but the last two are new 89 and, therefore, significant.
While the Schedule explains that "[e]ntrustment allows the foreign
representative office to directly instruct lawyers in the entrusted Chinese law
firm, as agreed between both parties," 90 the significance of provision (d) was
not well understood. European Union negotiators understood this provision
to mean that "arrangements with local law firms have been improved by
allowing foreign firms directly to instruct individual Chinese lawyers in
these firms. This will allow foreign firms to create a direct link with a
Chinese lawyer of their choice, which may in practice be equivalent to full
employment."9' Others concluded that "long-term entrustment" meant that
joint ventures would be permitted.92
Provision (e), like provision (d), is highly ambiguous. Under the
Provisional Regulations, foreign law firms could neither act as agents in
handling Chinese legal business nor interpret Chinese law for their clients.93
However, provision (e) seems to suggest there might be a gray area. The
provision was apparently added after negotiations with the EU, 94 and EU
negotiators believed it meant that "foreign law firms will, for the first time,
be able to offer services on Chinese law. In particular they will be able
' 95 to
provide information to their clients on the Chinese legal environment."
In addition to the business scope provisions, the schedule includes a
requirement that representatives of a foreign law firm be members of the bar
of a WTO member and have practiced for no less than two years outside
China.96 This was an apparent concession by China because the experience
requirement had previously been three years. 97 However, a chief
representative must still be a partner or of equivalent rank and have
practiced for no less than three years. 98

See Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, art. 16.
Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 6.
See Sino-E.U. Agreement, supra note 65, at 4.
See China's Entry to WTO Opens up Joint Venture Opportunities, supra note 5.
See Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, art. 16.
94 The provision does not appear in the U.S.-China accession agreement. Compare U.S.-China
Market Access Agreement, supra note 65, with Sino-E.U. Agreement, supra note 65, at 4.
95 See Sino-E.U.Agreement, supra note 65, at 4.
96 Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 7.
9' See Sino-E.U. Agreement, supra note 65, at 4.
98 Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 7.
"
90
91
92
13
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National Treatment Limitations Maintain Residency Requirements
and ProhibitHiring of Chinese Lawyers Overseas

The national treatment section of the "commercial presence" mode of
supply is a mix of existing restrictions and new provisions. The Schedule
specifies that, "[a]ll representatives shall be resident in China no less than
six months each year." Furthermore, "(t]he representative office shall not
employ Chinese national registered lawyers outside of China."1 °° Under the
Regulations, foreign law firms could not employ Chinese
Provisional
0
lawyers.' 1
IV.

CHINA ISSUES NEW REGULATIONS THAT DEVIATE FROM ITS
COMMITMENTS AND CREATE NEW BURDENS FOR FOREIGN LAW FIRMS

Only one month after the Doha meeting, the State Council
promulgated the Regulations on Representative Offices of Foreign Law
Firms in China ("Regulations"), thereby replacing the 1992 Provisional
Foreign Law Firm Regulations. 0 2 The Regulations became effective on
January 1, 2002.103 On July 4, 2002, the MOJ, which was tasked with
implementing the new regulations, published its Implementing Rules for the
2002 Foreign Law Firm Regulations ("Implementing Rules"), which were
made effective as of September 1, 2002. 4
Although the Regulations and Implementing Rules were promulgated
shortly after China's accession to the WTO, they appear to reflect a less
favorable attitude on the part of the Chinese government toward
liberalization of the legal services sector. This change. may be explained in
part by the lapse of time between bilateral negotiations of market access
agreements and actual accession, as well as the tremendous internal pressure
the Chinese government has faced from Chinese legal services providers
who remain at a competitive disadvantage to foreign firms.

99 Id. at 5.
'Do Id.

17.
:01Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 53, art.
0'Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in China Regulations, Dec. 22,
2001, State Council Order No. 338, translated in China Law Reference Service ref. no. 1400/2001.12.22
[hereinafter Regulations on Foreign Law Firms].
103 Id.

104Implementing the "Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in China
Regulations" Provisions, July 4, 2002, Ministry of Justice Order No. 73, translated in China Law
Reference Service ref. no. 1440/2002.07.04 [hereinafter Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms].
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Because most scholars agree that China's obligations under the GATS
do not have "direct applicability" or a "self-executing effect,"' 0 5 the GATS
commitments are not binding on the Chinese government or courts in the
absence of domestic legislation and regulations incorporating those
obligations. Therefore, the key to understanding the implications of WTO
accession for the legal services sector lies in a careful examination of the
new Regulations.'0 6 The Regulations in turn are a general policy statement
and should be read in conjunction with the Implementing Rules issued by
the MOJ. 0 7 For example, the Regulations do not address with any level of
specificity some of the most pressing questions raised by China's GATS
commitments. 108 The Regulations provide few details concerning the
application process for establishment of multiple resident representative

'o5 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 310-15
(1992) ("It is generally said that for the treaty rule to operate in the domestic legal system of a dualist state,
there must be an 'act of transformation,' that is, a government action by that state incorporating the treaty
norm into its domestic law."); Donald Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance,2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97, 99 (2003) ("In my view, as a practical matter, China's
WTO obligations will not become part of its domestic law, binding on courts and government bodies, until
the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation and regulations incorporating those obligations."). But
see Wang Tieya, The Status of Treaties in the Chinese Legal System, 1 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1995)
("Since treaties are directly applicable internally, it is not necessary to enact domestic laws for their
implementation .... ").
"0 However, "the treaty language usually has 'relevance' in interpreting
the statutory language, under
various theories of the domestic jurisprudence." Jackson, supra note 105, at 315.
107 Perry Keller describes the Chinese legislative system as comprised of two different forms of
legislative hierarchy. The one relevant to this Comment is:
[A] hierarchy of legislative categories, which can be simplified into three levels. Primary
legislation stands at the top of this pyramid, just below the Constitution in legal authority.
This type of legislation is often narrowly categorized as "falu," a term which is usually
translated as "law" and hence gives rise to considerable confusion in foreign accounts of
Chinese law. At the second legislative level, there are "fagui" which are issued in
different forms by the State Council and the regional People's Congresses. Although the
term "fagui" is usually translated as "regulations," there are in fact many other Chinese
legislative terms which, out of a lack of English language alternatives, must also be
translated as "regulations". This provides yet another source of confusion in the use of
English language translations of Chinese law. Finally, at the tertiary level, there are
"guizhang" which are issued in different forms by central government ministries and
regional and local governments. This term is also commonly translated as "regulation".
Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711,736 (1994).
Although tertiary rules cannot be directly enforced in the courts or be used as the basis for the
imposition of fines or penalties, they have many law like characteristics for those who are required to obey
their provisions. Id. They are enforced by the administrative bodies that issue them and, anecdotal
evidence suggests that judges give considerable weight to them in deciding how to apply formal laws and
regulations. Id.
10 Huen Wong & Owen Cox, Foreign Law Firms Set to Expand in China, CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar.
2002.
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offices.' 0 9 Similarly, the Regulations do not take a position on what types of
activities might constitute "providing information on the impact of the
Chinese legal environment" or whether "entrustment" relationships can take
the form of a joint venture.' 1° The Implementing Regulations, however,
address these provisions in greater detail.
A.

"Entrustment" Does Not PermitJoint Ventures

With respect to "entrustment" arrangements, Article 15 of the
Regulations merely restates the Schedule's statement that "entrustment"
means a representative office may make direct contact with lawyers of an
entrusted Chinese law firm."' Although this definition was thought to be
broad enough to encompass joint ventures, the Regulations do not provide
any additional clarification. 112 However, Article 39 of the Implementing
Rules specifically prohibits a representative office and its principal law firm
from either investing directly or indirectly in Chinese law firms, entering
into joint profit-sharing ventures with Chinese law firms or lawyers, setting
up an associated office or stationing staff in Chinese law firms to engage in
or owning an interest in
legal services, or managing, operating, controlling
3
the form of shares in Chinese law firms."
B.

"Chinese Legal Affairs" is Defined to Prohibit Foreign Firms From
Interacting with Government Entities and Providing Legal Opinions
Involving Chinese Law

Article 15 of the Regulations restates verbatim the Schedule's list of
' 4
permitted activities that do not involve "Chinese legal affairs." " However,
the Implementing Rules provide additional clarification on the types of
services that must be "entrusted" to a Chinese law firm:
(I)to be engaged in any litigation in China as a lawyer;
(2)to give legal opinions or certifications for any specific issues
in any contracts, agreements, articles of association, or other
109Id.
I10Id.
111Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 102, art. 15.
112See id.
113Id. art. 39. Professor Peerenboom explains that at least one MOJ official has acknowledged that
foreign lawyers would not be permitted to sit for the bar exam and foreign firms would not be allowed to
merge with Chinese firms "largely because of the possibility that foreign lawyers would then take an
aggressive stance on political cases." PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH, supra note 12, at 370.
114Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 102, art. 15.
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written documents with respect to application of Chinese
law;
(3)to provide legal opinions or certifications for any acts or
incidences with respect to application of Chinese law;
(4)to provide opinions or comments in the capacity of attorney
in arbitration on the application of the Chinese law and on
facts which involve the Chinese law;
(5)to go through, on behalf of its clients, any registration,
change, application, filing or other procedures with any
Chinese government authorities or any other organizations
that are authorized by laws
or regulations to carry out
15
administrative functions."
These provisions place new substantive limits on the business
activities of foreign law firms. Interestingly, the Implementing Rules
purport to prohibit interpretation or arbitration involving Chinese law not
just in China, but in other countries as well. The Implementing Rules also
prohibit foreign lawyers from interacting directly with Chinese government
officials. Under the Provisional Regulations, lobbying or other interaction
with government officials were not explicitly prohibited' 16 and, in practice,
foreign firms regularly advised clients on points of Chinese law, liaised with
7
various government agencies, and represented their clients in arbitration. ''
Article 33 of the Implementing Rules further limits the scope of
activity of foreign law firms. It states that "providing information on the
impact of the Chinese legal environment," one of the five permitted business
activities under the GATS Schedule, does not extend so far as to permit
representative law offices and lawyers to provide specific opinions on the
application of the laws of China." 8 To ensure that foreign law firms do not
circumvent this provision, the Regulations continue to ban the hiring of
practicing Chinese lawyers and forbid paralegals employed by foreign law
firms from providing Chinese legal services. "9

Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 32.
:61See Provisional Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note
53, art. 16.
..
7 PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA, supra note 23, at 37-38.
H8 Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 33.
19 Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 102, art. 16.
IS
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New "Genuine Need" Provision Restricts Circumstances in Which
ForeignLaw Firms May Open Additional Offices

Chapter 2 of the Regulations, which deals with the establishment,
change and cancellation of registration of resident representative offices,
copies verbatim the market access limitations specified by China in its
Schedule. 12 However, the Regulations also contain a requirement that a
foreign law firm have a "genuine need" to establish a resident representative
office in China. 121 When the Regulations were first published, this
requirement was a source of some confusion because the term22 had not
in the Regulations.1
appeared in the Schedule and was not defined
The Implementing Rules provided some insight into how the MOJ
intended to interpret the "genuine need" requirement. Article 4 of the
Implementing Rules defines "genuine need" to be determined on the basis of
the following:
(l)the social and economic circumstances of the place where
the representative office is proposed to be established;
(2)the need for legal services in the place where the proposed
representative office is to be established;
(3) the scale, time of establishment, major business areas and
specialist strengths, analysis on the prospect and future
business development plan of the proposed representative
offices; and
(4)the restrictions by the laws and regulations of China on
specific legal services or affairs.123
While extremely ambiguous and highly discretionary, this provision of the
Implementing Rules suggests some factors that might be considered by the
MOJ.

120 Regulations on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 102, ch. 2. For example, Article 7 requires that a
representative lawyer shall have been a practicing lawyer for not less than two years outside of China and
that the chief representative lawyer shall have practiced for a minimum of three years and hold a position
equivalent to that of a partner in the foreign law firm. Id.
121 Regulations on Foreign Law Firms art. 7.
122 See Schedule of Specific Comments, supra note 65.
123 Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 4.
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Three-Year Waiting PeriodFor Additional Offices Imposes Delay for
Some ForeignFirms

Although China's commitment to lift geographic and quantitative
limitations on foreign law offices was without a doubt the most significant
provision of the Schedule, the Regulations simply did not address
procedures for opening multiple offices. Article 10 of the Implementing
Rules contains two requirements for setting up "additional" representative
offices: (1) that the representative office "most recently" set up in China by
the foreign firm have operated "for three years continuously"; and (2) that
the representative offices already established have complied with the laws,
regulations, and rules of China as well as the codes of conduct and practice
for lawyers. 124 It is not clear whether the three-year waiting period applies
only to the opening of a second office or whether the waiting period restarts
with each additional office. 125 At minimum, the three-year waiting period
constitutes a delay for foreign firms that are late-comers to China.
V.

THE

REGULATIONS

AND

IMPLEMENTING

RULES

ARE

OVERLY

PROTECTIVE

Just one year after China's accession to the WTO, the record is still
too thin for any meaningful evaluation of the immediate impact of WTO
accession on the legal services sector in China. However, the promulgation
by the State Council and the MOJ of the Regulations and Implementing
Rules reveals some clues as to the pace at which the Chinese government
intends to pursue liberalization of the legal services sector. The MOJ's
policy with respect to the legal services sector appears to be to "facilitate
China's foreign trade and business as well as help the development of
China's legal profession" by encouraging Chinese lawyers to cooperate with
and learn from foreign counterparts, while simultaneously protecting
Chinese lawyers "against a massive influx of foreign lawyers." 126
Consistent with this view, the Regulations and, in particular, the
Implementing Rules do not appear to signal a dramatic shift in the Chinese
government's policy on foreign competition in the legal services sector.

id.
The Implementing Rules use the term "zuilin," which literally means "most recent." See
Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 10. This could be interpreted to mean a
three-year waiting period between each new office, or a three-year waiting period for the first new office
after the issuance of the implementing rules.
126 See Xiao, supra note II (describing the need
to protect domestic services providers).
124
25
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Rather, viewed together, the content of the Regulations and Implementing
Rules suggests a very cautious approach.
A.

The Regulations May Not Comply With China's Commitments Under
the GA TS

Although the Regulations and Implementing Rules represent a
significant revision of the Provisional Foreign Law Firm Regulations, there
are a number of provisions which not only conflict with the express terms of
China's specific commitments under the GATS, but add to the
administrative burdens that existed under the Provisional Foreign Law Firm
Regulations. In accordance with China's commitments under the GATS, the
Regulations and Implementing Rules establish procedures whereby foreign
law firms can open multiple offices, lower the experience requirements for
foreign lawyers from three to two years, and permit foreign law firms to
apply their knowledge of Chinese law in providing information on the
27
However,
impact of the Chinese legal environment on clients' businesses.
China's
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128
schedule.

The requirement of a "genuine need" has been interpreted by the U.S.
29
government as creating an economic needs test.1

Economic needs tests

appear in a variety of forms, depending on the country or service sector
130
As
involved, and are commonly employed to favor domestic suppliers.
discretionary
highly
is
test
needs
the
Rules,
defined by the Implementing
and could serve as both a geographic or quantitative restriction if, for
example, the MOJ were to decide that Beijing and Shanghai-the two most
attractive markets for foreign law firms-no longer had a "genuine need" for

lawyers.
127See discussion supra Part III.B.

2' See Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 5-6.
29 See USTR, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 44.

An economic needs test may be

defined as "a provision in national regulations, legislation or administrative guidelines [that] imposes a test
that has the effect of restricting the entry of service suppliers on the basis of an assessment of 'needs' in the
domestic market." Rosemary Morris, The Scheduling ofEconomic Needs Tests in the GA TS: An Overview,
in TRADE INSERVICES: NEGOTIATING ISSUES AND APPROACHES 27, 28 (OECD 2001).
130 See Morris, supra note 129, at 28.
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The three-year waiting period imposes a delay on the opening of
multiple offices that could affect all foreign firms, but disproportionately
hurts those firms that have not yet met the three-year requirement or have
not yet established a presence in China. The three-year waiting period could
also impose a delay on firms that have maintained a long-term presence in
China and that wish to open more than just two offices, because the threeyear clock may restart as of the establishment of the last representative
office. 31 The three-year waiting period is, in theory, supposed to be used by
the MOJ to evaluate the performance of a firm before permitting it to open a
second office 32 but, depending on how it is applied, it could also serve as a
quantitative restriction on the establishment of resident representative
offices.
Neither the "genuine need" requirement nor the three-year waiting
period can be squared with China's explicit commitment that "geographic
and quantitative limitations will be eliminated within one year after China's
accession to the WTO."'' 33 In a report to the United States Congress on
China's compliance with its WTO commitments, the Office of the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") has acknowledged that "procedures
for establishing a new office or an additional office are unnecessarily long
and call into question China's commitment to eliminate all quantitative
limitations on new offices by December 11, 2002."' 134 That said, China's
compliance with its GATS commitments on legal services will ultimately
depend on how strictly the MOJ enforces the Regulation, and judgment
should be reserved until a fuller record is available for review.
B.

The Regulations May Harm Chinese Law Firms and Retard the
Development of the Legal Services Sector in China

In addition to concerns that the Regulations and Implementing Rules
may violate the terms of China's accession to the WTO, a more practical
concern is the impact they may have on the development of the legal
services sector in China. Because the Regulations and Implementing Rules
put a protectionist spin on China's Specific Commitments under the GATS,
they initially represent a tilting of the playing field in favor of domestic law
firms. However, in the long run, they are likely to hinder the growth of the
I3 See Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 10.
"32
See Xiao, supranote 11.
133 Schedule of Specific Commitments, supra note 65, at 5.
134 USTR, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 44. See
also Murphy, supra note 8, quoting
Professor Donald Clarke: "This is certainly against the spirit of China's WTO commitments. In the WTO
agreement China didn't say: 'You can set up a representative office only if we think it's needed.'

MAY 2003

CHINA 'S NE W FOREIGN LA W FIRM REGULA TIONS

legal services sector in China because they go too far in protecting domestic
firms.
1.

The Regulations Favorthe Largest Foreign Firms

At the outset, it must be said that to the extent the Regulations merely
35
formalize restrictions that were only loosely enforced in the past,' they do
For example, the
not necessarily add to existing barriers to entry.
regulations that prohibit foreign law firms from circumventing registration
procedures by establishing new offices as consultancies or prohibit the
formation of joint ventures, which many observers believed would be
permitted under the Regulations' "entrustment" provisions, pre-dated the

Regulations. 136

However, depending on how they are enforced, the Regulations and
Implementing Rules may have carried over quantitative restrictions on new
offices in the guise of a three-year waiting period and several highly

These new and less predictable
ambiguous qualitative restrictions.
others. For example, in addition to
over
firms
some
favor
could
restrictions
factors the MOJ will consider
other
the
of
one
test,
needs
the economic
37
Although the rules do not
size.
applicant's
is
the
under its new rules
explicitly state that large firms will be favored, a survey of the firms that

have been approved for second offices under the new rules suggests that is
precisely how the MOJ has interpreted the rules.

38

Another example of a

new restriction is the six-month residency requirement for all representative
new restrictions impose substantially higher
attorneys. 139 These and other
140
firms.
law
foreign
on
costs
135 See Davis, supra note 58, at A6.
136 See discussion supra Part II.C.
137 Implementing Rules on Foreign Law Firms, supra note 104, art. 4.
138On June 10, 2002, Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance and Linklaters

three of the four largest U.K.

firms-became the first non-Hong Kong foreign firms to win approval to open second offices in China.
China Ends Office Restrictions for Foreign Firms, INT'L. FIN. L. REV. (July 2002). In December 2002,
U.K. firms Herbert Smith and Masons and U.S.-based Baker & McKenzie; O'Melveny & Myers; Vinson &
Elkins; and Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue were granted licenses to open second offices. O'Meiveny &
Myers LLP Opens New Office in Beijing, ASIA PULSE, Dec. 19, 2002, LExIS, News Group File; Foreign
Lawyers Proliferate, FAR E. EcON. REV., Jan. 9, 2003, at 22; Hong Kong Proves a Graveyard for
Camerons and Dewey Ballantine, LAWYER, Jan. 27, 2003, at 2. With the exception of Masons, all of the
firms granted licenses to operate second offices are among the top fifty highest grossing firms in the world.
The Global 100, AM. LAW., Nov. 4, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
139 Although this is a new restriction, it was a limitation listed on the GATS schedule. See discussion
supra Part III.B.2.
40 The six-month residency requirement means that firms can no longer fly in a representative or
cycle through a "team" of alternate representative attorneys and must instead invest significant human
resources, particularly in the case of a chief representative, into the establishment and maintenance of an
office. See Sommers, supra note I1. According to a former MOJ official, the Chinese authorities
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From an economic perspective, these costs are represented as higher
barriers to entry, both for foreign firms interested in entering the China
market and for foreign firms that have not yet met the three-year
establishment requirement. These restrictions and the uncertainty created by
ambiguous new provisions are therefore likely to favor the largest foreign
firms who already maintain a presence in China because, by virtue of their
size, these firms are better able to take advantage of economies of scale in
defraying these new costs.
2.

The Regulations Are Overly Protective and Fail to Provide Adequate
Opportunitiesfor Chinese Lawyers to Train with ForeignLawyers

For Chinese law firms, the Regulations and Implementing Rules
undeniably offer some short-term protection, the duration of which will
depend on how the MOJ enforces the Regulations. For example, under the
Implementing Rules, foreign firms are prohibited from hiring away
practicing Chinese lawyers from Chinese firms. 14' The Rules also carve out
areas where only Chinese firms may provide services, such as those
involving litigation or lobbying of government entities, and because the new
rules bar the formation of joint ventures or partnerships with foreign firms,
foreign firms must refer such matters to be handled by an outside Chinese
law firm. While these protections may initially sound appealing to Chinese
lawyer, there is a very real question as to how meaningful these protections
will be to Chinese firms in the long run.
Indeed, the Regulations may be too effective in protecting Chinese
firms from direct competition in matters dealing with "Chinese legal
affairs," potentially lulling these firms into a false sense of security and
discouraging them from competing against foreign law firms in areas outside
the scope of "Chinese legal affairs." ' 142 A protected niche might not seem
like a negative outcome for Chinese firms, but the reality of China's legal
services market is that it is increasingly dominated by multinational and
large Chinese corporate consumers of legal services. 143 "Law firms face a

recognized "[most foreign lawyers who are willing to go to such a developing country as China are young
practitioners who just receive [sic] their licenses. A lawyer with more than three years of practice
experience is more reluctant to go to China out of concerns over quality of life and living expenses. Hence,
this requirement can effectively limit the number of lawyers who may join the China practice." Xiao,
supra note 11.
141 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
142 id.
143 PEERENBOOM, LAWYERS IN CHINA, supra note 23, at 25. Three-hundred-fifty
billion dollars in
foreign investment in the last decade has driven the growth of China's economy. Keith Bradsher, Another
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huge demand to provide multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary advice
with a strong element of local knowledge . .. [and] 44are expected to offer
fully integrated services on all parts of a transaction.'
At the moment, Chinese law firms are ill-equipped to service these
multinational clients for a number of reasons, some historical, others
structural.145 Limitations on Chinese law firm participation in cross-border
and other complex transactions include the shortage of lawyers 146 and
4
Unfortunately, the
quality control problems that have yet to be resolved .
Regulations and Implementing Rules only exacerbate the problem by
48
counterparts.
limiting the interaction of Chinese lawyers with their foreign
Without exposure to cross-border transactions, Chinese lawyers may not be
able to develop the expertise necessary to compete with foreign firms for
this large, and growing, segment of the market.
A structural weakness of the Chinese legal services sector is its
fragmented organization. 149 It is almost entirely populated by a large
number of small or medium-sized firms averaging fewer than ten attorneys
and engaging in litigation practice.' 50 Only a few firms in Beijing and
Shanghai are large enough to deal in the more profitable areas such as legal
consultancy.15 1 As one Chinese lawyer explains, "lawyers in the smaller
firms either do not have the expertise to handle the complex trans[actional]
commercial matters, or do not have the foreign language skills to
communicate with the foreign clients effectively."' 5 2 More importantly, the
fragmented structure of the domestic legal services sector suggests an

Asian Nation Battling a Crisis in Its Banking System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at Cl; available at LEXIS,
News Group File.
144 Frances Gibb, U.K. Firms Could Provide Valuable Training, TIMES OF LONDON, Oct. 22, 2002,
2002 WL 100456748.
145 See Xiao, supra note 11.
146 See discussion supra Part II.B.
147

Id.
141 Id.

See also Sommers, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that the residency requirement in new

regulations effectively prevents foreign law firms from hiring Chinese LL.M. candidates studying
ov'.erseas).

149 A fragmented industry is characterized by the absence of market leaders with the power to shape
the direction of the industry. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 191 (1980) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY].

"'

Immature Law Firms Fight for Market Niche After WTO Entry, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK,

Mar. 5, 2002, 2002 WL 7262209. The largest firm in Shanghai, AllBright Law Offices, advertises itself as
"a full-service law firm of more than 150 attorneys." http://www.allbrightlaw.com/welcome/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 30, 2003). The largest law firm in Beijing, Lehman, Lee & Xu, boasts "over 100
experienced lawyers." http://www.lehmanlaw.com/lehman/Firm/firm/Firm summary.htm (last visited Apr.
30, 2003).
'5' Immature Law Firms Fightfor Market Niche After WTO Entry, supra note 150.
1s2

Id.
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absence of economies of scale or experience,' 53 which places Chinese law
firms at a competitive disadvantage 54to larger foreign firms that can leverage
economies of scale to reduce costs. 1
If Chinese law firms do not have an incentive to pursue cross-border
transactions now, the competitive gap with foreign firms is certain to widen.
If the Regulations and Implementing Rules favor the expansion of the
world's largest firms into China, while simultaneously reinforcing the
separation of Chinese and foreign firms in their respective market segments,
the result may be an even wider "competitive divide" between large foreign
firms, capable of taking advantage of economies of scale and scope, and
small Chinese firms, lacking the geographic presence and experience
necessary to compete.
VI.

FURTHER LIBERALIZATION IS NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN CHINA'S
LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR AND SUSTAIN HIGH LEVELS OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH

Because the protectionist approach reflected in China's new foreign
law firm regulations is not likely to improve the competitive position of
Chinese law firms in the long run, China should instead further liberalize its
legal services market by lowering barriers to entry and encouraging greater
interaction between foreign and Chinese lawyers. Competition should not
only accelerate the development of Chinese legal services providers, but
may also strengthen their competitive position internationally.
By
improving access to legal services, liberalization can also generate benefits
for the entire Chinese economy. In other words, China can support
development of efficient, professional Chinese legal services providers
without sacrificing economic growth. Indeed, an efficient legal services
sector, consisting of both foreign and domestic firms, is necessary to sustain
China's high levels of economic growth.
A.

Competition Should Accelerate the Development of Domestic Firms
and May Strengthen Their Competitive Position

Chinese firms would benefit from a more liberal regulatory
environment. Although few studies have directly examined the impact of

153See PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 149, at 196.
114 See Alan V. Deardorff, International Provision of Trade Services. Trade and Fragmentation, 9
REv. INT'L ECON. 244, 244-45 (2001).
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liberalization of legal services, 55 competition can generally strengthen,
rather than weaken, a firm's competitive position.' 56 Indeed, competition
can yield a number of strategic benefits, including increasing competitive
57
advantage, improving industry structure and aiding market development.
The experiences of other countries with legal services liberalization
support this conclusion. For example, greater international competition is
thought to have contributed significantly to the strengthening of German and

Canadian

law firms and to an improvement in their international

competitiveness.S 8 On the other hand, Japanese law firms, which continue

to operate in a heavily regulated and relatively closed domestic legal market,
remain small and tend to be less competitive internationally.1 59 Finally,
Hong Kong, which has long had the most liberal approach to foreign law

firms in Asia due to the historic presence
of British firms, has a much more
60
sophisticated legal services sector.
B.

Competition Can Generate Positive Welfare Effects for the Chinese
Economy
Not only can competition help strengthen Chinese legal services

providers, it can also generate benefits for the entire economy. In one
econometric study of the impact of competition on pricing and quality of
legal services in England and Wales, researchers found that "the threat of
competition... yielded significant welfare benefits" including a reduction in
the cost of such services and a "measurable improvement in consumer
satisfaction."61

155 Thierry Noyelle observes that "available measures of employment and output in professional

business services leaves much to be desired, rendering their analysis somewhat difficult." Thierry Noyelle,
Business Services and the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Trade in Services, in TRADE IN SERVICES:
SECTORAL ISSUES, at 312, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITP/26, U.N. Sales No. GE.89-56975 (1989).
156 See, e.g., MICIAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR
PERFORMANCE 201 (1985) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE].
See id. at 202-07 (noting that the presence of competitors can increase overall industry demand).
ss David M. Trubek et al., Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession: Global Restructuring
and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas,
44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 447 (1994); Richard L. Abel, Symposium, The Future of the Legal
Profession. Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 781-82 (1994).
"' R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 269, 299-303 (2002).
'60 Darryl D. Chiang, Foreign Lawyer Provisions in Hong Kong and the Republic of China on
Taiwan, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 306, 310-12, 342-44 (1995).
161 Simon Domberger & Avrom Sherr, The Impact of Competition on Pricing
and Quality of Legal
Services, in TIE REGULATORY CIIAI.LENGE 119, 137 (Matthew Bishop et al. eds., 1995).
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Historically, trade negotiations have traditionally focused on trade in

62
goods and reducing and eliminating barriers at the border for those goods.1

However, once goods are past the border, the efficiency of services defines

the ability of goods to penetrate the marketplace. 163 China, which has
historically had a particularly anemic services sector, accounting for only
thirty-three percent of its gross domestic product,' 64 has relatively more to
gain from liberalization because liberalization of services sectors will also
improve

the competitiveness

of Chinese

goods.

165

Thus, services

liberalization has implications for the efficient operation of the economy.
This is borne out by studies which have demonstrated that increasing
competition in services has a multiplier effect that enhances a country's
economic growth beyond the services sector, enhances the country's
66
competitive position globally, and expands market access for goods.,
Legal services, like many other services, may be thought of as a part
of the infrastructure of a global economy, one that plays a critical role in
facilitating the international trade of goods and other services. 167 In the
context of China's economy, legal services providers have a vital role to

play in China's transition as a new member of the WTO. Consider, for
example, that since joining the WTO, China has experienced a surge in
Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI"), which, according to the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC"), grew some 12.5%
in 2002 to reach record levels of over $52.7 billion.' 68 In 2002, China, for

the first time, may have surpassed the United States in becoming the world's
'62 See ROBERT B. CASSIDY, TRADE IN SERVICES IN CHINA: IMPLEMENTING THE WTO 25 (NBR
Special Report No. 3, Nov. 2002).
163 Id.
164 Compare to Hong Kong, which has one of the largest services sectors in the world that accounts
for 89% of GDP, the United States at 72%, Japan at 61%, and South Korea at 52%. WORLD BANK,
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2002). China's employment of service workers as a percentage of total
employment is a scant 12-13%, while service workers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Hong
Kong make up over 70% of their workforces. Id. Korea and Japan employ approximately 61% and 63% of
their workforces in services, respectively. Id.
165 Noyelle, supra note 155, at 37 ("Developing countries stand to gain relatively more than industrial
countries from liberalizing their services trade.").
166Deardorff, supra note 154, at 233. See also Azmat Gani & Michael D. Clemes, Services and
Economic Growth in ASEAN Economies, ASEAN ECON. BULL., Aug. 2002, at 155 (showing that
"expansion of the service sector seems to play a crucial role in the economic development of the ASEAN
economies, as services in general bind the other sectors of the economy such as manufacturing.").
167 See Deardorff, supra note 154, at 234. See also Noyelle, supra note 155, at 23 ("Business services
such as accounting and legal services are particularly important for reducing transaction costs, the high
level of which is often a major impediment to economic growth in developing countries.").
"i China's FDI Grows 12.51% in 2002, BUS. DAILY UPDATE, Jan. 15, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Group File; Press Release, Chinese Min. of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation [hereinafter
US$52.7 Billion, available at
China Reaches
to
MOFTEC];
Overseas Investment
http://english.moftec.gov.cn/article/200301/20030100063506 _.xml (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
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top recipient of FDI. 169 More than 400 of the world's 500 largest companies
have launched operations in China. 170 The number of newly-approved
foreign-invested ventures grew at an annual rate of 30.72% in 2002 with the
20%. 171
contractual volume of foreign investment increasing by almost
Foreign investment inevitably results in trade contracts, licensing
agreements and the formation of wholly foreign-owned entities or joint
ventures. Thus, if FDI continues to grow, as anticipated, 172 China's legal
services infrastructure will 7 similarly have to grow to fulfill the additional
demand for legal services.1 1
FDI is not the only driver of demand for legal services in the Chinese
economy. Bankruptcy of State Owned Enterprises and resolution of nonperforming loans remain two of the most important issues threatening
China's economic growth. 174 Resolution of these issues requires "an
effective and efficient system of reorganizing insolvent enterprises, and
transferring resources out of non-viable uses and into more productive
ones." 175 Another source of demand for legal services is the financial
services sector, which, since China's entry to the WTO, has experienced one
of the highest levels of growth of any sector of the economy. 176 However,
the regulations governing foreign lawyers have not permitted foreign law
firms to adequately meet the demand for legal services in this sector.

Foreign Investment Hits Record, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 15, 2003.
170BBC Monitoring Int'l Rep., More Than 4 out of 5 of the World's Leading 500 Firms Now in
169

China, Sept. 8,2002, available at LExis, News Group File.
171Press Release, MOFTEC, supra note 168.
172See Annual FDI to Hit US$1OOB, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 2, 2003, LEXis, News Group File. The
Development Research Centre under the State Council estimates that FDI will reach $100 billion in every
year of the 11 th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). Id.
173See Deardorff, supra note 154, at 234, stating:
Many services play a critical facilitating role in the international trade of products other
than themselves, including both goods and other services. This is most obviously true of
transportation services, which are necessary for all international trade in goods. But it is
also true, perhaps to a lesser extent, of other services such as finance, insurance, and
communication, as well as some professional services that are often needed in order to
complete the international exchange of goods.
174Private Development Unit, World Bank, Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China-A Case and
Agenda for Reforming the Insolvency System (Sept. 20, 2000), at iii.
175

id.

i76

See Howard H. Jiang & Christian M. Lucky, FinancialServices in China, REV. BANKING & FIN.

SERVICES, Sept. 1, 2003, available at 2002 WL 101825395.
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The Regulations Should be Revised to Lower Barriers to Entry and
Permit GreaterInteraction Between Foreignand Chinese Lawyers

To encourage the development of an efficient, sophisticated legal
services sector, the Chinese government should encourage more competition
by revising the Regulations, and, more specifically, their Implementing
Rules. Rather than discouraging entry of newcomers to the legal services
market, the Regulations should encourage the establishment in China of a
more diverse group of small and medium-sized foreign law firms. To that
end, the MOJ should strive to improve the transparency of the regulations
and reduce particularly costly barriers to entry by eliminating the "genuine
need" requirement and the three-year waiting period.
The MOJ should also encourage more interaction between foreign law
firms and Chinese lawyers. One way to loosen existing restrictions in a
controlled manner would be to eliminate the two-year practice requirement
for resident representative attorneys in the case of Chinese lawyers who are
recent graduates of foreign LL.M. programs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Some commentators have suggested that China's new regulations
governing foreign law firms violate the terms of its specific commitments
under the GATS. However, while compliance with GATS may be one
reason to revise the regulations, a more compelling reason for revising the
regulations is that they are not likely to meet the Chinese government's own
goals of "facilitat[ing] China's foreign trade and business" and help[ing] the
development of China's legal profession." 177 Although the Chinese
government's desire to protect an infant domestic legal services sector is
understandable, a more effective approach to improving the competitiveness
of China's domestic legal services providers would be to liberalize access to
the legal services market. Liberalization and the competition it brings would
invigorate the development of Chinese legal services providers, lower
transaction costs and improve the efficiency of the Chinese economy.

177

See Xiao, supra note 11.

